Torres v. Metropolitan Life by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-1-1999 
Torres v. Metropolitan Life 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Torres v. Metropolitan Life" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 188. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/188 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
(Corrected Dissenting Opinion) 
 
Filed June 24, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 97-5709 
 
EDWARD D. TORRES, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
On Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Expenses 
(District of New Jersey Civil Action No. 96-cv-01401) 
(Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky) 
 
Argued January 28, 1999 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA 
and ROSENN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 24, 1999) 
 
       CARL OXHOLM, III, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       JERRY L. TANENBAUM, ESQUIRE 
       Connolly, Epstein, Chicco, Foxman, 
        Engelmyer & Ewing 
       1515 Market Street, Suite 900 
       Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
 
  
       B. JOHN PENDLETON, JR., 
        ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
       McCarter & English 
       Four Gateway Center 
       100 Mulberry Street 
       Newark, New Jersey 07101-0652 
 
        Attorney for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is a motion for an award of attorney's fees and 
expenses arising from the settlement of an employment 
discrimination lawsuit by Edward D. Torres against 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife"). For the 
reasons that follow, we will grant Torres's motion but refer 
the matter to a Magistrate Judge for determination of the 
appropriate amount of fees. 
 
I. 
 
In March 1996, Edward Torres commenced a pro se 
employment discrimination suit against MetLife under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e to 
2000e-17 (West Supp. 1999). Torres alleged that MetLife 
unlawfully discriminated against him because he is 
Hispanic and terminated his participation in MetLife's Pre- 
Appointment Training Program in retaliation for reporting 
the discrimination to several MetLife officers. The District 
Court granted Torres's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 
In September 1997, MetLife filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the District Court granted on the basis 
that Torres lacked standing to sue under Title VII because 
he was not an "employee" of MetLife while enrolled in the 
training program. 
 
Torres filed a notice of appeal and moved for appointment 
of counsel. On March 17, 1998, a motions panel of this 
Court granted Torres's motion and appointed attorneys Carl 
Oxholm III and Jerry L. Tanenbaum, both of the lawfirm 
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Connolly, Epstein, Chicco, Foxman Oxholm and Ewing 
("Connolly Epstein"), as co-counsel to Torres. In an 
engagement letter signed by Torres and his new attorneys, 
Torres agreed that Connolly Epstein would represent him 
pro bono publico but assigned to Connolly Epstein all right 
and title to any legal fees that a court might require MetLife 
to pay. 
 
Subsequently, Connolly Epstein prepared Torres's appeal 
while attempting to negotiate a settlement with MetLife. On 
July 16, 1998, the parties orally agreed to settle their 
dispute and MetLife's attorneys began drafting a settlement 
agreement. Shortly thereafter Torres and MetLife executed 
an Agreement and Release in which MetLife agreed to pay 
Torres $45,000 in settlement of all claims. The settlement 
agreement does not contain any reference to attorney's fees. 
The parties also executed a Stipulation of Dismissal with 
Prejudice of the Pending Lawsuit and filed it with this 
Court. 
 
Torres now moves for an order requiring MetLife to pay 
Connolly Epstein attorney's fees and expenses in the 
amount of $30,427.14, representing the work done by 
Connolly Epstein in preparing Torres's appeal and 
negotiating and executing the settlement, as well as the 
cost of preparing this motion.1 By order of this Court, 
Torres's motion was referred to this merits panel for 
disposition.2 
 
II. 
 
A prevailing party is entitled to recover its reasonable 
attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render 
such an award unjust. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-5(k) (West 
Supp. 1999) (providing for recovery of fees in Title VII 
employment discrimination lawsuits); Independent Fed'n of 
Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Initially, MetLife filed a cross-motion seeking attorney's fees and 
Rule 
11 sanctions against Torres, but MetLife subsequently withdrew the 
cross-motion. 
 
2. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
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Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 
(1968). A "prevailing party" is one that "succeed[ed] on any 
significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the 
benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit." Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (citation omitted). 
MetLife does not dispute that Torres qualifies as a 
prevailing party. Instead, MetLife argues Torres's motion 
must be denied because the settlement agreement was a 
"global agreement" extinguishing all of Torres's claims 
against MetLife, including a claim for attorney's fees. In 
support, MetLife offers extrinsic evidence of the parties' 
intent, including statements from Mr. Tanenbaum (who has 
since left Connolly Epstein) that he believed the agreement 
settled all of his client's claims against MetLife, including a 
potential claim for attorney's fees. 
 
When the parties to a settlement agreement dispute 
whether the prevailing party waived its statutory right to 
attorney's fees, "the burden is on the losing party to show 
that the settlement agreement clearly waived" such right. El 
Club Del Barrio, Inc. v. United Community Corps., 735 F.2d 
98, 99 (3d Cir. 1984). In El Club Del Barrio, which similarly 
involved a claim for recovery of attorney's fees in a Title VII 
suit, we expressly rejected a "silence equals waiver" rule 
and held that "extrinsic evidence such as the course of 
negotiations" is irrelevant. Id. at 100. A suit for recovery of 
attorney's fees is foreclosed only upon express stipulation 
in the settlement agreement: "If the parties cannot agree on 
counsel fees and the losing party wishes to foreclose a suit 
. . . for attorneys fees, it must insist that a stipulation to 
that effect be placed in the settlement agreement. We so 
hold." Id. at 101. 
 
The settlement agreement here contains no such 
stipulation. In fact, it does not mention attorney's fees at 
all. MetLife cites the section of the agreement entitled 
"Plaintiff's Release And Waiver of Claims," which states in 
part: 
 
       Without limitation, Plaintiff specifically releases all 
       claims, charges, or demands asserted or assertable in 
       the Pending Lawsuit, and all claims, charges, or 
       demands arising from or relating to Plaintiff 's 
       relationship of any kind with the Released Parties, 
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       including without limitation any rights or claims 
       Plaintiff may have under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
       of 1964, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
 
This language, although broad, does not expressly stipulate 
that Torres's claim for attorney's fees is waived. 3 As El Club 
Del Barrio makes clear, that is the end of the analysis. It is 
irrelevant whether Mr. Tanenbaum and the other attorneys 
believed the release extinguished a claim for fees, as 
MetLife contends. A settlement agreement that is silent as 
to attorney's fees will not be deemed to constitute a waiver, 
regardless of the course of negotiations. See El Club Del 
Barrio, 735 F.2d at 100; Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
794 F.2d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[W]here a defendant 
seeks to settle its total liability on a claim, it shall be 
incumbent upon the defendant to secure an express waiver 
of attorney's fees. Silence will not suffice.") (citation 
omitted). To hold otherwise would be to embrace the 
"silence equals waiver" rule that we have repeatedly rejected 
since El Club Del Barrio. If the parties to a settlement 
agreement wish to extinguish the prevailing party's claim 
for attorney's fees, they must do so specifically and 
expressly in the terms of the agreement. Because the 
parties here did not do so, Torres's claim for attorney's fees 
was not waived. 
 
MetLife relies on Conrad v. Bergen Community College, 
1996 WL 903946 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 1996), in which the 
District Court denied the plaintiff 's request for attorney's 
fees even though the settlement agreement contained no 
express waiver. The District Court in Conrad based its 
ruling on the fact that during negotiations, plaintiff 's 
counsel gave "the impression" that fees would not be 
requested and defense counsel therefore formed a 
reasonable expectation that all attorney's fees were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The dissent argues the release "expressly extinguish[ed] all claims to 
attorney fees" and that the agreement "could not be made more plain." 
We disagree. As we stated in El Club Del Barrio, the release must 
"clearly" waive plaintiff's right to attorney's fees. 735 F.2d at 99. The 
agreement here contains a general release that does not mention 
attorney's fees. It could easily have been "made more plain" through a 
specific provision unambiguously stating whether Torres's claim for 
attorney's fees was reserved. 
 
                                5 
  
encompassed within the agreement, regardless of the 
absence of an express waiver. Id. at *4. To the extent that 
Conrad would authorize a court to consider extrinsic 
evidence of the course of negotiations or the expectations of 
the parties, we believe it was wrongly decided. The clear 
import of El Club Del Barrio and Ashley is that it does not 
matter whether the parties discussed the issue of attorney's 
fees or believed the settlement agreement waived such a 
claim. All that matters is whether the agreement expressly 
stipulates that the prevailing party's claim for fees is 
waived. If it does not, then the claim survives.4 
 
Similarly, we believe the dissent's reliance on Wakefield 
v. Mathews, 852 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1988) is misplaced. In 
Wakefield, the release was not silent as to attorney's fees, 
but expressly included "costs or expenses of any nature 
whatsoever." Id. at 483. For precisely this reason, the 
Wakefield court understood its decision to be fully 
consistent with El Club Del Barrio and Ashley. See id. at 
484 ("We are in full agreement with the Third Circuit's 
resolution of both the El Club Del Barrio and Ashley cases. 
Waiver of attorney's fees should not be presumed from a 
silent record."). 
 
The rule that claims for attorney's fees survive unless 
expressly waived is strongly grounded in policy 
considerations. As we observed in El Club Del Barrio, 
"Requiring the district court to inquire into the 
circumstances of settlement negotiations and to determine 
who said what to whom when seems a pointless exercise 
where observance of a formality will suffice." 735 F.2d at 
100-01. We continue to believe that consideration of 
extrinsic evidence in these circumstances "unnecessarily 
complicates litigation" and that adherence to a clear rule of 
law is preferable. Id. at 100. A bright-line rule serves the 
additional virtue of promoting informed settlements, as the 
parties will know in advance whether their agreement truly 
forecloses a post-settlement petition for fees. See Ashley, 
794 F.2d at 138.5 Also, such a rule is consistent with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We express no opinion on whether a court may look beyond the four 
corners of the settlement agreement in evaluating a claim or defense 
based on fraud, duress, accident, or mistake. 
 
5. The rule we apply today will not leave "settlements and releases under 
the Act in chaos, stripped of any finality," as the dissent contends. On 
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Supreme Court's determination that prevailing civil-rights 
plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to recover attorney's 
fees. See El Club Del Barrio, 735 F.2d at 100 (rejecting a 
"silence equals waiver" rule because it "pays inadequate 
attention to the presumption established in Hensley and 
Piggie Park in favor of prevailing civil rights plaintiffs"). 
 
Consequently, we reiterate the holding of El Club Del 
Barrio and Ashley. If parties wish to extinguish a claim for 
attorney's fees, they must do so specifically and expressly 
within the terms of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, 
we will grant Torres's motion. 
 
III. 
 
The parties also dispute the reasonableness of the 
amount of fees requested. On this issue, we believe fact- 
finding is required. We will therefore refer the matter to a 
Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation on the 
appropriate amount of fees. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the contrary, we believe such an outcome could result from the dissent's 
invitation to consider whether the parties "viewed the waiver as inclusive 
of attorney's fees," thus raising questions of the parties' intent and the 
course of negotiations. A bright-line rule directing parties to insert 
specific provisions covering attorney's fees will clarify settlement 
agreements and promote finality. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I believe that the polestars to be followed in the 
construction of an agreement and release are the 
contractual language and the parties' intentions. Highly 
trained and experienced lawyers for the parties negotiated 
the settlement between Torres and the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company (MetLife or the Company) and later 
reduced it to writing. The written agreement and release 
plainly and unreservedly includes within its terms a 
settlement expressly extinguishing all claims to attorney 
fees to which the plaintiff might be entitled under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e (the Act). 
I therefore respectfully dissent and would deny the 
plaintiff's motion for counsel's fees. 
 
I. 
 
Following his termination by MetLife of his participation 
in its Pre-appointment Training Program,1  Torres filed a pro 
se employment discrimination suit against the company 
under Title VII. The district court entered summary 
judgment for the Company on the ground that Torres 
lacked standing to sue under Title VII because his 
enrollment under the Training Program did not render him 
an employee. He appealed to this court. 
 
On Torres's motion, we appointed two lawyers, Carl O. 
Oxholm, III, and Jerry L. Tanenbaum, co-members of the 
law firm of Connolly, Epstein, Chicco, Foxman, Oxholm and 
Ewing (Connolly Epstein), to represent him. His newly 
appointed lawyers sent Torres an engagement letter dated 
March 23, 1998, in which they set forth that they would 
represent him pro bono publico but that he would assign to 
Connolly Epstein all right to any legal fees that any court 
or other tribunal might require MetLife to pay. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The program was designed to enable individuals interested in personal 
insurance to investigate employment opportunities in the insurance field. 
The program stated that participants were not employees of MetLife and 
required participants to maintain any other employment they presently 
had. Torres continued his employment with the Internal Revenue 
Service. MetLife released Torres from the program after four weeks. 
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Except in special situations not here relevant, American 
courts, unlike English tribunals, do not award attorney fees 
to a prevailing party except where there is a statutory 
mandate for such payment. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 443-44 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). In Title VII cases, there is such a 
mandate, and Torres and his counsel relied on it. Title VII 
provides that "the Court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 42 U.S.C. SS 1988 and 2000e-5(k). Torres filed 
his suit for discrimination in the United States District 
Court under Title VII, and the motion by his counsel before 
us now for attorney fees specifically recites that they claim 
attorney fees pursuant to Title VII for services incurred in 
the appeal and in the preparation of their motion. 
 
In July 1998, while Torres's appeal was pending, the 
parties settled the case for $45,000. In a formal settlement 
agreement and release, Torres specifically agreed,"without 
limitation," to release 
 
       all claims, charges, or demands asserted or assertable 
       in the Pending Lawsuit . . . , including, without 
       limitation, any rights or claims Plaintiff may have 
       under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
       amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Plaintiff 
       agrees not to file or assert any claim, suit, or demand 
       against any of the Released Parties that has been 
       waived or released in this agreement. 
 
(Emphasis added). Thus, in exchange for $45,000, Torres 
agreed to globally release MetLife of any and all claims that 
he had under Title VII. His attorney fees claim and the 
claim of his counsel to whom he assigned his right to 
attorney fees is under Title VII. 
 
The settlement agreement and release specifically and 
expressly includes within its terms "any rights or claims 
Plaintiff may have had under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964" and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. There is nothing 
in this record to show that there was any dispute as to the 
plaintiff's right to attorney fees or the amount to be paid. 
There is no claim that there was ever any disagreement 
between the parties as to whether any rights or claims were 
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to be reserved or would otherwise survive the settlement 
agreement's sweeping release. 
 
There is no reservation in the settlement agreement and, 
as far as the record shows, no demand by Connolly Epstein 
before the execution of the agreement and stipulation of 
dismissal of the pending lawsuit that MetLife separately pay 
it any costs or attorney fees in addition to the sum specified 
in the release. Connolly Epstein did not reserve or attempt 
to reserve any rights or claims for costs or attorney fees in 
the settlement agreement and release. Upon the execution 
of the settlement agreement, Connolly Epstein and MetLife 
executed a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice of the 
pending lawsuit and filed it with this court, which 
dismissed the case pursuant to the stipulation. 
 
There can be no question that Connolly Epstein knew 
that the sole basis for any claim for attorney fees by them 
or Torres was predicated solely upon Title VII of the Act. 
Although Tanenbaum, who performed most of the services 
for Torres's appeal, is no longer with Connolly Epstein, it 
was unequivocally clear to him and his co-counsel, 
Oxholm, without any reference by the court to extrinsic 
evidence proffered by MetLife, that the plaintiff fully and 
unambiguously released in his settlement agreement 
whatever rights or claims he had under Title VII. Similarly, 
it should be clear to the court from the written agreement 
that Torres released all rights or claims under the Act. 
Oxholm, in his affidavit in support of the motion for 
attorney fees, represents that he not only graduated from 
Harvard Law School cum laude, but that his "extensive 
activities on behalf of pro bono legal services" have earned 
for him various honors, including the Pro Bono Publico 
Award of the American Bar Association. He also claims 
"extensive experience in the preparation, trial and 
management of significant business litigation including the 
civil rights cases in this Court." Furthermore, Oxholm also 
asserts in his affidavit that since he left the City Solicitor's 
Office in 1989 to join Connolly Epstein, he was"the only 
attorney representing the City [Philadelphia] and all of its 
officials in the three dozen civil rights cases arising out of 
the City's confrontation with MOVE (In re City of 
Philadelphia Litigation)." 
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Oxholm also avers that he sought the assistance of his 
partner, William H. Ewing, who had graduated first in his 
class at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, in 
developing the legal arguments made on behalf of Torres 
and that Ewing also serves as co-chair of the Connolly 
Epstein Employment Law Department. Tanenbaum is a 
1992 summa cum laude graduate of Temple University Law 
School, where he ranked first in his class and was editor- 
in-chief of the Temple Law Review. There can be no 
misunderstanding on the part of these experienced and 
highly trained lawyers that a release "without limitation [of] 
any rights or claims plaintiff may have under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended," did not reserve any 
right to attorney fees under the Act. 
 
The motion for legal fees by Connolly Epstein not only 
represents that attorneys Oxholm and Tanenbaum 
performed services in behalf of Torres in connection with 
the appeal and settlement, but that a considerable time 
was spent in reviewing the Title VII statute, its definitions 
and research in connection therewith. Tanenbaum spent 
time in settlement discussions with his client, with the 
Company, and Oxholm and Tanenbaum conferred with 
respect to "settlement strategy." It is inconceivable and 
incomprehensible that they did not know, especially 
considering their expertise in employment law and in Title 
VII cases, that the comprehensive and global language of 
the release they executed did not reserve the right to collect 
attorney fees claimed under Title VII. Disingenuously, after 
the settlement check of $45,000 cleared the bank, Deborah 
Weinstein, in behalf of Connolly Epstein, wrote MetLife 
counsel on August 17, 1998, requesting that MetLife pay 
them an additional $22,174.14 in counsel fees and 
expenses. 
 
Torres signed the settlement agreement with benefit of 
these attorneys who are experts in employment law, 
specifically with respect to Title VII cases. They advised 
him, agreed to the broad language of the release, and filed 
the Stipulation of Settlement dismissing the action with 
prejudice. Of course, they knew that the language of the 
release included all matters, and did not reserve any claim 
for attorney fees and expenses. 
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In their claim for attorney fees and expenses, Connolly 
Epstein maintains that Torres is entitled to additional 
reasonable attorney fees and expenses for the appeal of this 
case because he is the prevailing party pursuant to Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. SS 1988 and 2000e-5(k). It boldly asserts that 
"the settlement documents do not release MetLife from 
Torres's entitlement to recover attorney fees and expenses." 
In support of the motion, it argues that Torres has not 
settled his claim for attorney fees and expenses because a 
waiver of the statutory right to attorney fees and expenses 
"must be expressly set forth in the settlement documents." 
The agreement and release, however, expressly includes an 
extinguishment of all rights and claims under the Act; it 
clearly includes the right to any attorney fees and expenses 
claimed under the Act. It could not be made more plain 
than the settlement language releasing without limitation 
"any rights or claims plaintiff may have under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act as amended." 
 
In support of its motion, Connolly Epstein cites to El Club 
del Barrio, Inc. v. United Community Corporations, 735 F.2d 
98 (3d Cir. 1984), and Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 
794 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986). Those cases, however, are 
inapposite and distinguishable. Both of them concern 
situations where the parties could not agree on counsel 
fees, attempted to reserve the issue of attorney fees, and 
therefore omitted any reference to them in their agreement. 
In both El Club del Barrio and Ashley , the original 
settlement agreements proposed to the plaintiffs in the 
course of the negotiations for settlement included language 
referring to attorney fees. This language, however, was 
subsequently deleted upon the objection of the opposing 
party. 
 
In both of the above cases, this court was asked to 
determine whether silence in a revised settlement 
agreement under such circumstances constituted a waiver 
of rights to attorney fees under Title VII when an express 
reservation of rights clause had been negotiated out of the 
initial settlement drafts. Based on the record in both of 
those cases, this court concluded silence did not constitute 
a waiver, regardless of the course of negotiations. We held: 
"If the parties cannot agree on counsel fees and the losing 
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party wishes to foreclose a suit under section 1988 for 
attorney's fees, it must insist that a stipulation to that 
effect be placed in the settlement agreement." We did not 
require that the specific words "attorney fees" be replicated 
in haec verba. In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever 
that the parties did not expressly agree on a settlement to 
release attorney fees. 
 
This case is altogether different from the foregoing cases 
cited by the movants. References to attorney fees were not 
deleted from a prior draft of the settlement agreement in 
this case. There is no evidence that there was any dispute 
concerning the amount and the payment of attorney fees. 
The $45,000 settlement and release was comprehensive 
and its language plainly included a release of the right to 
attorney fees and expenses under the Act. The agreement 
expressly sets forth the waiver of all rights and claims 
under the Act. No mistake or fraud is claimed in the 
drafting of the release and stipulation. Allowing a motion 
for substantial attorney fees in the face of the settlement 
and release here not only gives Torres a windfall but as a 
matter of policy leaves written settlements and releases 
under the Act in chaos, stripped of any finality. 
 
The majority is concerned that the failure to mention the 
magic words "attorney's fees" in the release requires the 
court to inquire into the circumstances of settlement 
negotiations and to determine who said what to whom 
where observance of a formality will suffice. It also believes 
that "consideration of extrinsic evidence in these 
circumstances unnecessarily complicates litigation." 
Because I fully agree with the policy that forbids 
consideration of extrinsic evidence of pre-contract 
negotiations, I believe that the parties should be held to the 
four corners of the settlement agreement carefully drafted 
by expert counsel for the plaintiff. No extrinsic evidence as 
to prior negotiations or any prior conversation is necessary 
to understand the full import of the unambiguous, 
comprehensive, written statement before us. A court need 
only construe and enforce the settlement agreement as 
written. See Baltimore v. Baltimore R.R., 10 Wall (77 U.S.) 
543, 551 (Dec. Term 1870) (holding court "is required to 
give effect to the contract which the parties chose to make 
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for themselves"). A court should not, through the 
application of a bright-line rule, impose contractual terms 
upon the parties to which they did not agree. See Imperial 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452, 462 (1894) ("The 
courts may not make a contract for the parties. Their 
function and duty consist simply in enforcing and carrying 
out the one actually made."); New Orleans v. New Orleans 
Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79, 91 (1891) ("Courts have no 
power to make new contracts or to impose new terms upon 
parties to contracts without their consent. Their powers are 
exhausted in fixing the rights of parties to contacts already 
existing."). 
 
In Wakefield v. Mathews, 852 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1988), 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also had an 
opportunity to construe Ashley and El Club del Barrio. It 
sustained a broad release against a claim for attorney fees 
under section 1988, and noted that in Ashley and El Club 
del Barrio "the original agreements had included language 
referring to attorneys' fees, but upon objection the language 
was deleted." Id. at 484. 
 
The majority attempts to distinguish Wakefield  on the 
ground that the release in Wakefield included "costs or 
expenses of any nature whatsoever." But that release did 
not include "attorney fees." The Wakefield court noted that 
in Ashley this court found that the agreement including 
"costs" as part of the settlement did not include attorney's 
fees. Wakefield concluded, however, that it did not disagree 
with El Club del Barrio and Ashley on the record before it, 
but that the agreement before it was broader and the 
record different than in El Club del Barrio and Ashley: "It 
contains no indication that plaintiffs made any attempt to 
exempt attorney's fees from the language of the proposed 
settlement agreement." Id. at 484. Like Wakefield, "the 
release in this case is not only more sweeping than 
anything contained in the agreement in those cases, but it 
must also be interpreted in light of a record which reflects 
that the parties . . . viewed the waiver as inclusive of 
attorney's fees." Id. at 485. 
 
II. 
 
When we look at the general design of the settlement 
agreement and release in this case, as well as at the 
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circumstances under which it was written and the suit that 
was settled and dismissed with prejudice, and give the 
language of the settlement agreement a rational meaning 
consistent with its express general purpose, the payment of 
$45,000 constituted a final settlement of all claims that the 
plaintiff had under the Act, including attorney fees and 
expenses. The motion for attorney fees should be denied. I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
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